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RECENT TRENDS
PAROLE REVOCATION
In Morrissey v. Brewer,1 the United States
Supreme Court held that due process requires
"a simple factual hearing" before parole can be
revoked. 2 The Court reasoned that the liberty
of a parolee, although conditional, "includes
many of the core values of unqualified liberty
and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on
the parolee and often on others." s Thus, the
Court concluded that what is required before
termination of parole is a two-stage process,
consisting of a reasonably prompt hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that the parolee has violated a condi-
tion of his parole4 and later on, if requested by
the parolee, a full revocation hearing in front
of the parole board.5 Minimum due process re-
quirements were enunciated by the Court for
each stage of the process." One year later, in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli 7 the Court extended the
Morrissey due process protections to revoca-
tions of probation."
Several courts have struggled with the prob-
lem of determining when a parolee has en-
dured a "grievous loss" sufficient to trig-
ger the due process requirements of
Morrissey-Gagnon.9 In Means v. Wain-
wright,10 the Florida supreme court held that
1408 U.S. 471 (1972).
2 Id. at 483.
3 Id. at 482.
4 Id. at 485.
5 Id. at 487.
6 Id. at 485-89.
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
S For a general discussion of the implications of
the Morrissey-Gagnon due process doctrine see
Cohen and Tobriner, How Much Process is "Due"
Parolees and Prisoners?, 25 HAsT. L.J. 801
(1974); Fisher, Parole and Probation Revocation
Procedures After Morrissey and Gagnon, 65 J.
CRI25. L. & C. 46 (1974) ; Note, Limitations Upon
Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions of
Probation, 8 GA. L. REv. 466 (1974).
9 In addition to the cases discussed in this sec-
tion see Gardner v. McCarthy, 503 F.2d 733 (9th
Cir. 1974); Williams v. United States Board of
Parole, 383 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1974) ; In re
Valrie, 12 Cal. 3d 139, 524 P.2d 812, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 340 (1974).
10o299 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1974).
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the Morrissey requirements were applicable to
the revocation of an unexecuted grant of
parole. 1 The court reasoned that the "grievous
loss" suffered by the person whose parole is
revoked is no different than the "grievous
loss" suffered by the person whose unexecuted
grant of parole is rescinded. Thus, the sum-
mary recission of petitioner-Mean's parole was
held to be a violation of the due process man-
date of Morrissey-Gagnon. In Snwu v.
Britton12 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that it is the "execution" rather
than the "issuance" of the revocation warrant
which triggers the due process time limits for
the revocation hearing set forth in Morrissey33
The petitioner had contended that the federal
parole board's delay in affording him a revoca-
tion hearing until after the completion of his
service of an intervening state sentence consti-
tuted a violation of his right to due process.
In rejecting this claim, the court noted that the
Morrissey requirement for a parole revocation
hearing was triggered only "within a reason-
able time after the parolee is taken into cus-
tody." :4 It was determined that such custody
for the federal parolee was not effectuated
until after the parolee revocation warrant had
been actually executed. While noting the gen-
eral rule that the warrant must be executed
within a reasonable time,'1 the Small court ac-
11 The court cited In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 470,
503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972), in sup-
port of its position. The Prewitt case held that,
with the exception of the preliminary hearing, the
minimum due process requirements of Morrissey
are constitutionally required for parole recission
hearings.
12500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974).
13The court rejected the following decisions
which stand for the proposition that it is the "is-
suance" of the revocation warrant which triggers
the due process time limits set forth in Morrissey:
Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1974); Jones v. Johnston, 368 F. Supp. 571
(D.D.C. 1974); Sutherland v. District of Colum-
bia Board of Parole, 366 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C.
1973).
'uMorrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488
(1972) (emphasis added).
15 Simon v. Moseley, 452 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.
1971).
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cepted the petitioner's incarceration in a state
institution as good reason for the delay in such
execution. 6
In Peele v. Sigler"1 a seemingly conflicting
result was reached by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington.
The court held that once a revocation warrant
is issued and lodged as a detainer, a revocation
hearing must be granted within a reasonable
time in order to allow the parolee an opportu-
nity to refute the charges.' s It was reasoned
that the filing of such detainer causes a prisoner
to lose eligibility for many types of rehabilita-
tion programs and results in many more prison
restrictions being placed upon him. In addition,
a federal detainer might conceivably distort the
decision by state officials as to when to grant
parole from the holding institution. These re-
strictions imposed upon the prisoner were de-
termined to constitute a sufficiently "grievous
loss" so as to bring the Morrissey due process
standards into play.' 9
TRANSCRIPTS FOR INDIGENTS
The rights of indigents to the basic instru-
ments for an adequate trial or post-trial pro-
ceeding are now broadening in several juris-
dictions despite a temporary setback. When the
Supreme Court granted the indigent petitioner
access to trial transcripts for use in appellate
proceedings, Griffin v. Illinois,20 it opened the
doorway for additional rights of indigents be-
:16 Accord, e.g., Small v. United States Board of
Parole, 421 F2d 1388 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 1079 (1970); Robinson v. Wil-
lingham, 369 F2d 688 (10th Cir. 1966).
2 7.F. Supp. - (E.D. Wash. 1974).
18 The court did not reach the issue of whether
the issuance of or the execution of an arrest war-
rant gives rise to the right to a revocation hearing
within a reasonable time. Therefore, the decision is
not directly in conflict with Small v. Britton, 500
F.2d (10th Cir. 1974). However, the Peele court's
holding that Morrissey requires a revocation hear-
ing within a reasonable time after the filing of
a parole detainer, would seem to be in con-
flict with the Sinall conclusion that the paro-
lee's incarceration in a state institution tolls the
timing requirements of Morrissey, notwithstanding
the fact that a federal parole detainer has been
filed against him.
19 In so holding, the court is expressly rejecting
the view of the Fifth Circuit on this issue, as stated
in Cook v. United States Attorney General, 488
F2d 667 (5th Cir. 1974).
20 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
fore the court.21 The extension of such rights
to indigents was founded on the constitutional
principles of due process and equal protection -
that a fair adjudication of a party's claim
should not be denied on the basis of poverty.
2'
Nevertheless, the Court qualified this right to-
a state-provided transcript, 23 creiting a loop-
hole through which the expansion of indi-
gents' rights to prior transcripts was temporar-
ily blocked. In Britt v. North Carolina,2 4 the
Supreme Court upheld the state court's denial
of Britt's request for a free transcript of the
mistrial for use in the second trial. This deci-
sion was based on the Court's finding that al-
ternative means existed by which the appellant
could have constructed an adequate defense.
Britt constitutes the first limitation on the
Griffin policy toward indigents.
2 5
In light of recent decisions in state and fed-
eral courts, however, it appears that the future
of the Griffin policy is one of expansion rather
than limitation. The oNinth Circuit ruled in
MacCollom v. United States26 that an indigent
federal prisoner was entitled to a free tran-
script of his criminal trial to assist him in the
preparation of a post-conviction motion under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.27 After being convicted and
21 Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970) (right
to transcripts for use in habeas corpus proceed-
ings); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969)
(right to transcripts for use in de novo habeas
corpus hearings); Robert v. La Vallee, 389 U.S.
40 (1967) (right to preliminary hearing records
for preparation of trial) ; Long v. District Court,
385 U.S. 192 (1966) (right to transcript of trial
for use in appeal of habeas corpus proceeding).
22 The general constitutional theory was that,"in criminal trials a state can no more discrimi-
nate on account of poverty than on account of re-
ligion, race, or color." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
at 17 (plurality opinion of Black, J.).
'3 The caveat inserted in the Griffin majority
opinion stated:
We do not hold, however, that Illinois must
purchase a stenographer's transcript in every
case where a defendant cannot buy it. The Su-
preme Court may find other means of afford-
ing adequate and effective appellate review to
indigent defendants. Id at 20.
24 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
25 See Note, Criminal Procedure-Free Tran-
scripts for Indigents, 51 N.C.L. REv. 621 (1973).
See also Ross v. Moffltt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
26 F2d - (9th Cir. 1974).
27 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides in pertinent part
that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a
court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that
1975]"-
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imprisoned in 1970, MacCollom filed a motion
for a transcript in forma pauperis in 1972. The
court clerk notified him that no action would
be taken upon the request until MacCollom
filed a motion for post-conviction relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. After complying with such
notice, MacCollom was granted his request and
obtained appointed counsel. However, the
§ 2255 action was dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
appointed counsel argued that he could not
represent to the court the existence of any
constitutional grounds for relief without first
explaining the transcript, yet the law seemed
to require assertion of a claim prior to issu-
ance of the transcript. Although the Supreme
Court had never reached this point, the Ninth
Circuit majority found that Griffin and its pro-
geny mandated a finding for the indigent peti-
tioner. Neither these cases nor the Constitution
were found to require the indigent to have a
better memory of his trial than the nonindigent
petitioner. Furthermore, the court noted that
the cost of such transcripts to the government
should not be overestimated. First, the cost of
opposing the request may exceed the cost of
preparing the trial transcript. Second, a tran-
script provided upon demand may reveal no
colorable ground for relief and thus dispel the
need for a § 2255 motion altogether. In fur-
therance of these views, the Ninth Circuit held
that the indigent federal prisoner in this situa-
tion has an unqualified right to a free trial
transcript and need not demonstrate a "partic-
ular need."
Pollard v. Kidd2 s constitutes a recent consid-
eration of a similar point by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia. Pollard, an indigent state prisoner
convicted of robbery, brought a civil action
under 42 U.S.C. § 198329 alleging that the state
the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States ....
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,
may move the court which imposed the sen-
tence to vacate, set aside or correct the sen-
tence.
28 383 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1974).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, or any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizens of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
trial court's denial of his request for portions
of his trial transcript was unconstitutional.
Stating that Pollard "has raised a valid consti-
tutional claim and has made a showing of need,
however slight," the federal court determined
that due process and equal protection require
the state to provide the plaintiff with the tran-
script portions relevant to that claim. The
court further stated that an application of a
stringent "particular need" as set forth by a
recent Fourth Circuit case30 was not necessary
in this case. Therefore, the holding in the Pol-
lard case is that "whenever a litigant seeks to
raise claims of a constitutional dimension
which are not patently frivolous, on collateral
review of his conviction in either a state or
federal court," 31 he will be granted access to
the portion of the transcript which can be
identified with reasonable particularity and
which have arguable relevance to the constitu-
tional claim. No denial of such a request will
be made unless the claim is "patently frivo-
lous" or the, portions are "absolutely irrele-
vant."
State courts are following this trend of ex-
panding the Griffin policy, as demonstrated by
Blazo v. Superior Court.3 2 In this case, the
Massachusetts supreme court concluded that
the indigent state defendant is entitled to a
cost-free process for obtaining a stenographer
for a misdemeanor trial, upon a good-faith rep-
resentation by counsel that the stenographer
record is necessary to insure the defendants'
rights. The reasoning this court drew from
Griffin and its progeny was that the misdemean-
or defendant should not be deprived of the
stenographic facilities routinely provided for
felony defendants simply because these are
crimes of lesser grades. Fair and comparable
treatment at public expense should be provided
at all criminal levels to protect the defendants'
right of appeal. This court found that a re-
quirement of a pre-trial demonstration of the
need for a stenographer rather than alternative
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
30 Jones v. Superintendent, 460 F.2d 150 (4th
Cir. 1972).
31383 F. Supp. at 1059.
32 _ Mass. , 315 N.E.2d 857 (1974).
[Vol. 66
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means of recording could prove difficult and
damaging to even a misdemeanor defendant's
case.33 Thus the court holds that the determi-
nation of such need must be left to the indi-
gent's counsel, just as it would be left to a
nonindigent's counsel. Any objection the court
may have to the delay or expense necessitated
by the request will be considered in an infor-
mal hearing. At the conclusion of this Griffin-
oriented decision, the Massachusetts court, un-
like the federal courts, recognizes the
limitation of Britt. It recognizes the shortage
of competent stenographers and the possible
expense of providing transcripts. Alternative
methods of recording are suggested as a gen-
eral solution for the future. Nevertheless, the
course offered for the present coincides with
the concept of Griffin that indigents must be
treated in a manner equivalent to that of non-
indigents before the court.
IMPEACHMENT OF DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY
Significant exceptions to the Mapp and Mi-
randa exclusionary rules were enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in Walder v.
United States" and Harris v. New York.
85
Two lower court decisions have attempted to
clarify the scope of this Walder-Harris excep-
tion, as it relates to the use of illegally seized
evidence for impeachment purposes.3 6
33 See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498
(1963).
34 347 U.S. 62 (1954). In Wader, a defendant
charged with possession of narcotic drugs testified
on both direct and cross-examination that he had
never possessed or sold narcotics. The trial court
permitted the prosecution to present, in rebuttal,
evidence of a heroin capsule, which had been un-
lawfully seized from the defendant's home. The
jury was charged that the heroin was admitted
solely for the purpose of impeaching the defend-
ant's credibility. The Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court decision and held that the illegally-
seized evidence could properly be used as the basis
for impeachment of a defendant's testimony on"collateral matters."
35 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris, the defend-
ant had made a statement which was inadmissible
under the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). During the trial, the defendant
took the stand and made statements on direct ex-
amination which contradicted the prior inadmissi-
ble statement The Supreme Court held that the
prosecution could use the defendant's prior inad-
missible statement to impeach the defendant's testi-
mony on direct, where the proper jury admonition
had been given.
36 For a general discussion of the implication of
the Walder and Harris decisions see Comment,
In United States v. Tweed.7 the defendant
was charged with the illegal possession of de-
structive devices. At trial, he testified on both
direct and cross examination that he was not
in possession of any dynamite on the occasion
in question. The trial court permitted the pros-
ecution to introduce expert testimony indicat-
ing that the defendant's clothing, which had
been unlawfully seized, contained traces of cer-
tain chemicals found in ammonia dynamite.
The jury was admonished that this evidence
could only be considered in passing on the de-
fendant's credibility and could not be consid-
ered as evidence of guilt. On appeal, the de-
fendant argued that it was error for the trial
court to have admitted the rebuttal evidence.
In affirming the defendant's conviction, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the illegally-seized evidence was properly
admissible for impeachment purposes, notwith-
standing the fact that it was used to impeach
testimony relating directly to the crime
charged. The court noted that Harris had
eliminated any distinction between impeach-
ment as to collateral matters and impeachment
as to testimony bearing more directly on the
crimes charged. Further, the fact that the pros-
ecution's evidence was circumstantial in char-
acter did not vitiate its admissibility as im-
peaching evidence.
In People v. Sturgiss the Illinois supreme
court was faced with the issue of whether re-
versible error occurred when the trial court al-
lowed the prosecution to use for impeachment
purposes certain statements sworn to and
signed by the defendant in his motion to sup-
press. At trial, the defendant had denied, on
cross examination, that the police had taken
any physical evidence from him. The prosecu-
tion challenged the credibility of this testimony
by noting the variance of the addresses where
the arrest was said to have been made and the
allegation in the suppression motion relating to
the seizure of physical evidence. The trial
court permitted this line of questioning over
The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 73 COLUm. L. REv. 1476 (1973); Note, Im-
peachinent by Unconstitutionally Obtained Evi-
dence-The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule, 34
OHIO STATE L.J. 706 (1973).
Z 503 F2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974).
38 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E. 2d 545 (1974).
19751
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defendant's objections, and admitted the motion
into evidence for impeachment purposes. Rely-
ing principally upon Simmons v. United
States"9 and Brown v. United States40 the de-
fendant argued that it was reversible error for
the trial judge to permit a damaging admission
necessary to raise a fourth amendment claim to
be used against him at the subsequent trial.
In rejecting defendant's contention, the court
stated that the Simmons-Brown doctrine must
be read in harmony with the Harris admoni-
tion that, "[e]very criminal defendant is privi-
leged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse
to do so. But that privilege cannot be con-
3S 390 U.S. 377 (1968). The court forbade the
use at trial of a defendant's inculpatory testimony
given in support of a motion to suppress the evi-
dence.
40411 U.S. 223 (1973). The Court interpreted
Simmons to prohibit the direct admission at trial
of an accused's testimony given during a suppres-
sion hearing in order to establish standing to raise
a fourth amendment claim.
strued to include the right to commit
perjury." 41 Thus, the use of the suppression
motion to impeach the defendant was viewed
by the Sturgis court as merely an effectuation
of the Walder-Harris impeachment exceptions
to the exclusionary rule.
Sturgis is an important case for three rea-
sons: (1) it extends the Walder-Harris ration-
ale to cover the use, for impeachment purposes,
of a defendant's testimony in support of his mo-
tion to suppress evidence; (2) it permits such
impeachment as to testimony relating to col-
lateral matters, as well as testimony relating to
matters more directly bearing upon the crimes
charged; and (3) it finds impeaching evidence
as to defendant's testimony on cross-examina-
tion, as well as direct examination, to be within
the scope of admissible rebuttal evidence.42
41 Harris v. Ne. York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
42 Contra, People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 501
P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1972).
[Vol. 66
